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The European Commission has been requested by member states to study the 
incorporation of air transport into their existing Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).  
Only CO2 is to be included, at least initially. 
This paper focuses on the method of allocation of emissions permits in the EU 
context.  It has been assumed here that the EU ETS will be applied only to intra-EU 
flights and that airlines will be the entities selected for implementation.  Three UK 
airlines were selected to evaluate three main types of allocation: grandfathering, 
auctioning and benchmarking. The airlines were representative of the three major airline 
business models: network, LCC and charter/leisure.  Based on 2003/04 aircraft/engine 
type and operating data, the per passenger impact of each allocation option was 
analysed for each airline.  A new benchmarking approach is proposed that takes into 
account both the landing and take-off cycle (LTO) and per kilometre emissions: this 
avoids penalising shorter sector operators and focuses on the damage caused by aircraft 
and their engines and not on passengers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
There has been a growing interest in the environmental impact of aviation, both in terms 
of noise and aircraft engine emissions.  Discussions have included both mitigation 
measures and methods of internalisation of these environmental costs (or the principle 
of polluter pays). 
 
This paper focuses on engine emissions, which have both local and climate change 
implications, and where the emphasis of most recent discussions has centred.  This has 
taken place at an international, regional and local level:  The standing Committee on 
Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) has been asked to investigate proposals for emissions trading, in 
addition to ICAO’s role in setting international standards for engine emissions. 
 
At the regional level, the European Commission is studying the possibility of 
incorporating emissions trading into their existing Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
from 2012 (European Commission, 1999, and subsequent press releases).  They are also 
likely to introduce a directive that sets limits of local air quality that would also affect 
local emission levels around airports.  Thus in Europe, aviation is likely before too long 
to be required to control or pay for both its local and climate change impacts of aircraft 
engine emissions.  Up to now this has only been subject to longer term changes through 
increasingly stringent ICAO standards applied to new aircraft engines, and airport 
emissions charges at a few EU airports. 
  
-  3  - 
The pollutants considered as the main ones emitted from aircraft movements 
(Woodmansey and Patterson, 1994) are CO2, PM, SO2, NOx and HC.  The first, CO2, 
has lower unit social cost than the others, but the total amount emitted is far larger 
(especially for the cruise part of the flight).  Social costs are defined as the damage to 
human health, vegetation, buildings and climate change.  Their valuation is discussed in 
Mayeres et al (1996) and Perl et al (1997).  The other pollutants account for a lower 
weight of emissions but have higher unit social costs.  CO2 is estimated to have the 
longest life (50 to 100 years) followed by methane (8-10 years), with NOx lasting only 
a number of days or weeks.   However, the global warming impact from aviation is 
compounded by the emissions of NOx and water vapour in the upper atmosphere, the 
latter sometimes leading contrails and cirrus cloud formation (these effects are 
summarised in Annex 2 of European Commission, 2005).  This is difficult to deal with 
through an ETS and it is intended to address it through other measures, one of which 
(standards) is discussed below. 
 
Europe is the region of the world with the greatest pressure to reduce emissions, and it 
is also the region where almost all of the countries have ratified the Kyoto Convention.  
The EU has also pushed for the inclusion of environmental impacts in the EU/US 
aviation bilateral agreement.  Growing concern is also evident in other world regions, 
reflected in the work programme of ICAO referred to above. 
 
The first section of this paper will discuss Kyoto and the context for emissions trading, 
and the efforts at an international and regional level to reduce aircraft engine emissions.  
This will be followed by a look at the various voluntary measures (targets) initiated by 
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the industry.  The fact that such progress is too slow (see ECAC, 2005) leads to the need 
for imposing incentives, which can be addressed emphasising emissions trading.   
 
2 Means of engine emissions reduction  
 
2.1  Regulatory standards 
 
Regulatory initiatives have been taken in order to limit both local health impacts of 
emissions and climate change gases.  The first covers a number of gases and is more 
relevant to airports, with air transport treated in the same way as other industries.  The 
second is focused on CO2 and NOx, and the cruise mode of operations, with air transport 
generally thought to have a greater impact on climate change than suggested by its 
output of these gases.  
 
It is more appropriate to introduce local measures to reduce LTO emissions; however, 
the greenhouse gas element of these are also relevant to the climate change gas 
stabilisation that is incorporated in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and subsequent Kyoto Protocol.  Article 2.2 requires the 
parties to work towards the limitation in emissions through ICAO, without laying down 
any timescale (IATA, 2001). 
 
Up to this point, ICAO’s involvement in this field had been the encouragement of 
improved emissions of new aircraft engines.  Aircraft are required to meet the engine 
certification standards adopted by the Council of ICAO. These are contained in Annex 
16 - Environmental Protection, Volume II - Aircraft Engine Emissions to the 
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Convention on International Civil Aviation. These were originally designed to respond 
to concerns regarding air quality in the vicinity of airports. As a consequence, they 
establish limits for emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), carbon monoxide, unburned 
hydrocarbons, for a reference landing and take-off (LTO) cycle below 915 metres of 
altitude (3 000 ft). There are also provisions regarding smoke and vented fuel. 
 
2.2 Trends and targets 
 
Airlines and their associations have set themselves targets for increased fuel efficiency, 
which provide proxies for CO2 efficiency gains.  The International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) adopted a goal of achieving a 26% improvement overall between 
1990 and 2012 in litres per 100 Revenue tonne-kms or RTKs (IATA, 2005).  This was 
not especially onerous, since airlines such as British Airways had already achieved a 
20% improvement by 2000. 
 
British Airways has a target of a 30% improvement in fuel efficiency between 1990 and 
2010 (British Airways, 2004).  The metric they use is RTKs per gallon, and they are 
close to achieving this goal with their 2005 level 27% below the 1990 level (British 
Airways, 2006). 
 
The first aviation and environment summit convened by the major international air 
transport airline and airport trade associations highlighted the 70% improvement in fuel 
efficiency over the past 40 years (ATAG et al, 2005).  This study compared today’s 
modern aircraft with fuel consumption of 3.5 litres per 100 passenger-km with similar 
consumption for a modern compact car.  They concluded with a shorter term target of 4 
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litres per 100 passenger-km in 2008, versus an average of 4.5 in 2002.  This is an 
average annual reduction of 1.9%, significantly higher than recent trends, and 
achievable through the implementation of improved operational practices. 
 
In the longer term, fuel efficiency (and thus CO2 efficiency) improvements have been 
possible of little more than 1% a year, and this is expected to slow in the future (see 
Table 9-2 in IPCC, 1999).  With traffic forecast to grow by 4-5% a year, emissions are 
clearly set to increase significantly unless further measures can be introduced.  
Emissions trading provides the means to do this most economically, without resorting to 
physical controls.  
 
There is a range of existing technologies now available to reduce fuel burn considerably 
faster than the more recent trend.  Green (2005) describe the technologies available for 
reducing fuel burn and NOx, as well as contrails.  For fuel burn, they range from the 
operational improvements identified in ICAO of 8% to the laminar flying wing with 
open rotor propulsion that would produce an almost 70% reduction in fuel burn per 
tonne-km. 
 
Over the past 20-30 years there has been some economic incentive to apply new 
technologies from intermittent spikes in jet kerosene prices.  Airlines may be entering a 
period of high fuel prices of longer duration, which would by itself give an incentive to 
technical innovation.  This would have a beneficial impact on fuel burn and CO2, but 
possibly adverse affect on NOx.     
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ACARE introduced a target of a 50% reduction in CO2 emission per tonne-km for an 
aircraft entering production in 2020 relative to its year 2000 equivalent (Green, 2003).  
For NOx a target of 80% was specified over the same period (ACARE, 2002). 
 
 
3 Emissions trading and air transport 
 
Emissions trading schemes are becoming more widespread with the EU ETS started in 
2005 and a similar scheme (RGGI) for seven states in the northeast of the US, capping 
CO2 emissions at their 1990 level.  Voluntary schemes have been launched domestically 
in the UK (British Airways participate) and Japan. 
 
Introducing an aircraft engine emissions trading scheme has been studied and discussed 
since the 1990s, both at the world and regional level.  Considerable analysis has been 
applied to an international scheme by ICAO’s CAEP mentioned above.  The reluctance 
of the US to be involved and other problems has meant that actually introducing such a 
scheme is unlikely for the foreseeable future, at least at a world level. 
 
In Europe, the focus switched from a preference for emissions charges and taxes 
(European Commission, 1999) to emissions trading as the best way forward.  A 
European scheme is now very likely to become reality for air transport in 2011/2012.  
The European Commission published a study on economic incentives to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions from air transport in 2002 (CE Delft, 2002).  Their analysis 
was limited to two policy options: an environmental charge and a Performance Standard 
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Incentive (PSI).  The latter was based on emissions per unit of output, but did not 
address the allocation of permits or trading. 
 
The most effective way of meeting the policy objectives are: 
• Emissions trading 
• Emissions charges 
 
Both the above are economic instruments that would lead to the internalisation of the 
cost of climate change.  Each could, in principle, be designed to achieve the same level 
of emissions reduction. (European Commission, 2005). 
 
4 The EU ETS scheme 
 
Given the problems in introducing an emissions tax on a regional basis, the EU member 
countries are generally keen to see aviation brought into the EU ETS which so far has 
been introduced for a number of other industries.  ICAO has been considering aviation 
emissions trading schemes, and encourages such regional initiatives, given the 
impossibility of introducing it worldwide at the present time. 
 
A study by CE Delft (2005) for the European Commission examined concepts for 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to address the full climate change impact of aviation 
through emissions trading.  This required the consultants to propose options in terms of 
the scope of an EU scheme, the allocation and surrendering of allowances, and data 
requirements.  They also looked at the impact of these options, including any possible 
distortions to competition. 
-  9  - 
 
The study concluded that aircraft operators would be the best entity upon which to base 
the system, with allocation at the EU, rather than individual member state level.  It also 
came out in favour of including only CO2, at least initially.  It looked at the possibility 
of restricting the scope to intra-EU flights, as well as including all flights to/from EU 
airports. 
 
As to the allowance allocation method, the study reported that ‘auctioning appears to be 
the most attractive option for allocation’.  Their second-best option was benchmarking, 
and the least attractive was grandfathering, although this could be combined with the 
other methods.. 
 
The study evaluated the impact of the various options on short-haul, medium haul and 
long-haul flights, but did not measure the impact on the different airline business 
models.  This paper attempts to do this, building on some of the assumptions considered 
in the Delft study. 
 
This paper also seeks to re-assess some of the Delft study’s statements on distortion.  
They stated in their executive summary that ‘...any carrier operating between eg Paris 
and Copenhagen will be subject to exactly the same competitive conditions’.  This is 
true for origin-destination passengers, but one carrier (e.g. Air France) may feed a high 
proportion of the passengers on this sector to long-haul flights, while another (e.g. 
easyJet) might have no long-haul feed. 
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Furthermore, Air France (in the above example) will have to find or purchase allowance 
for its Copenhagen-Paris-Houston traffic, while Continental could fly the same 
passenger non-stop via Newark with no environmental accountability. 
 
Frontier Economics (2006) is the only detailed airline response so far to the European 
Commission’s study.  It agreed with the possibility of airlines having allowance 
submission responsibility, but also proposed that airports are considered as an 
alternative, without going into detail.  As with slots, airports may not be best placed to 
encourage the most efficient system.  They supported the use of fuel burn as the unit of 
charge, but came out strongly for a wider scope than just intra-EU flights. 
 
In fact, they estimate that intra-EU coverage would capture just 42 million tonnes of 
CO2, compared to a total of 213 million for all flights departing and arriving at EU 
airports.  CE Delft (2005) reported the somewhat different 52 million tonnes intra-EU 
compared to 162 million tonnes in total based on 2004 Eurocontrol data.  
 
5 Analysis of three airline business models 
 
The three business models selected for analysis are a network carrier, charter or leisure 
airline and a Low Cost Carrier (LCC).  These were all from one country, UK, both to 
reduce possible distortions and because of greater data availability.  The airlines are: 
 
• British Airways (Network carrier) 
• easyJet (Low Cost Carrier) 
• Britannia/Thomsonfly (Charter/leisure airline) 
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These three provide some variation in operational characteristics such as average sector 
length, passenger load factor and the share of RTKs on intra-EU routes. 
 
5.1 Operational characteristics 
 
Table 1 below gives the main traffic and operating data for the three UK airlines 
selected for the analysis.  The key difference between the models are evident: the higher 
load factors for the LCC and charter models, and their higher density seating.  The 
charter airline uses larger aircraft, some of which are employed outside Europe.  
Whereas almost all easyJet’s RTKs were within the European Economic Area (EEA), 
Britannia/Thomsonfly operates longer haul charters to the Caribbean, Mexico, Egypt 
and Asia.  British Airways carries the major part of its RTKs on routes to/fom non-EEA 
countries (although its also carried some traffic on its short-haul subsidiaries, not 
included in this analysis). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Any ETS scheme focused entirely on intra-EEA or EU flights/traffic would clearly 
impose a relatively larger burden on easyJet.  It could also hasten the trend by charter 
airlines to move into longer haul leisure flights, and increase the medium haul focus for 
all airlines to North Africa and non-EU Eastern Europe. 
 
5.2 Fleets and fuel burn 
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British Airways’ short/medium haul fleet consists of a mixture of A319/320 and B737 
aircraft.  The latter comprise three different variants, but two engine types.  easyJet 
operate the B737-700 and B737-300 types, and are replacing the latter with A319s of 
the same capacity.  Britannia/Thomsonfly mainly used its B757-200s on European 
sectors, with some B767s at peak times.  However, with the birth of Thomsonfly, B737-
500s and A320s have been introduced into the fleet. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
British Airways is a little below the industry average fuel efficiency in both passenger 
and seat terms.  easyJet perform much better, due both to more seats per aircraft and a 
higher average passenger load factor (Figure 1).  Britannia/Thomsonfly also has high 
seat density, and even higher load factors, in addition to operating larger aircraft types. 
 
 
6 Methodology for the analysis of three allocation methods 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The method of allocation of ETS allowances is crucial in terms of the scheme’s impact 
on various players.  It is assumed here that the relevant entity has been selected to be the 
airline.  There are three main methods: 
 
• Grandfathering allowances 
• Auctioning allowances 
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• Benchmarking 
 
A combination of the first and last has also been proposed (Sentance & Pulles, 2005), 
and also the first and second (Hewett and Foley, 2000, and Butzengeiger et al, 2001). 
 
6.2 Grandfathering 
 
Grandfathering involves allocating free allowances based on past emissions.  Each year, 
once these were used up airlines would be required to purchase allowance from other 
airlines or other trading entities.  It is intended that the other entities would be those 
already in the EU ETS, and including these is crucial in obtaining the benefits of 
limiting CO2 at least cost.  The allocation could be by negotiation or by applying a 
formula, with the latter preferred because of lower transaction costs (Butzengeiger et al, 
2001). 
 
Grandfathering tends to reinforce the status quo, and reward the more polluting airlines 
with pollution allowance that they do not have to pay for.  Any further expansion could 
only be obtained by more environmentally efficient aircraft, or the purchase of the 
necessary allocation from others at the market price. 
 
A key question is setting the baseline for past emissions and thus allocation.  The 
existing ETS scheme used an average of the past three years.  A five year average is 
also possible, but that includes the sharp post-9/11 downturn.  An average of three or 
five years historical data would put the LCCs at a serious disadvantage, since they have 
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grown by more than 30% a year since then.  New entrants would have to purchase all 
their allowances. 
 
According to Wang (2005), The UK allocation plan for the EU ETS used an average of 
emissions for 1998 to 2003 for the baseline.  This was considered unacceptable by this 
study’s case study airline, Britannia, because of the inclusion of the heavily 9/11 
distorted years 2001 and 2002.  For the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (that started 
earlier) 1998-2000 was chosen as the baseline.  British Airways reported exceeding 
their commitment to reducing emissions by 19% compared to this baseline (Sentance 
and Kershaw, 2005). 
 
6.3 Auctioning 
 
Auctioning allowances would be undertaken by the administering authority.  In the EU 
context this could be the European Commission.  Airlines would need to bid for the 
CO2 emissions that they would expect to need for the coming year or season.  This is a 
fair method, especially between incumbents and new entrants, and faster and slower 
growing airlines.  Auctioning can be combined with grandfathering.  The major 
question with auctioning is how to apply the proceeds from the auctions.  The money 
raised should be spent on CO2 reducing projects, but could also be used as general tax 
revenue, or returned to airlines in proportion to traffic or through aviation related 
projects. 
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6.4 Benchmarking 
 
Benchmarking has the advantage of rewarding airlines that have already introduced 
efficient aircraft, and those that achieve higher efficiency than their competitors.  It is 
thus favoured by airlines that have high passenger load factors, eg LCCs (Frontier 
Economics, 2006). 
 
Benchmarking involves the determination of a baseline efficiency measure, say RTKs 
per tonne CO2, fixing an overall CO2 cap, and allocating CO2 allowances depending on 
an airline’s share of RTKs.  This is the most likely EU aviation ETS approach: 
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n = number of airlines taking part 
RTKtotal  = Total RTKs in the base period for those taking part 
RTKi  = Total RTKs assigned to airline i in the base period  
Etotal  =  Emissions assigned to all airlines in the base period 
Ei  =  Emissions assigned to airline i in the base period 
Ai  =  Emission allowances assigned to each airline 
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First, this method puts a smaller burden on those airlines operating with high load 
factors and over longer sectors.  Second, those airlines flying shorter sectors would tend 
to be penalised, although Sentance and Pulles (2005) argue that this would encourage 
passengers to take less polluting forms of transport such as rail. 
 
The above criticisms are addressed by using aircraft kms and flights as the efficiency 
measures, and not RPKs.  This gets closer to penalising higher emitters, removing any 
reference to passenger loads as being irrelevant. 
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Ai  =  Ai(km)  +  Ai(flights) (8) 
 
n = number of airlines taking part 
p = number of aircraft/engine combinations 
Ei(km)  =  Emissions assigned to airline i in the base period based on kilometres and 
aircraft type (j) flown 
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Ei(flight)  =  Emissions assigned to airline i in the base period based on number of flights 
(LTO) and aircraft type (j) flown 
Ekm  =  Emissions assigned to all airlines in the base period based on kilometres and 
aircraft types flown 
Eflight  =  Emissions assigned to all airlines in the base period based on flights and 
aircraft types flown 
Ai(km)  = Emission allowances assigned to each airline based on aircraft km performed 
Ai(flight)  =  Emission allowances assigned to each airline based on number of flights 
(LTOs) 
Ai  =  Total emission allowances assigned to each airline 
Fi  =  Total flights performed by airline i for all EEU fleet 
Di  =  Total departures (LTOs) by airline i for all EEA fleet 
 
The impact of each of the above benchmarking approaches will be analysed in the next 
section. 
 
7 Results 
 
7.1 Grandfathering 
 
The impact of 100% grandfathering was evaluated for the three types of UK airline 
(described in Section 5).  British Airways has been growing slowly in RTK terms over 
the past three years (+4% pa) and also over the past five years (+3% pa).  There would 
thus not be a large difference between a three or five year average.  They would also not 
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have to purchase too much extra allowance over the next few years, given their paucity 
of firm aircraft orders and deliveries. 
 
A previous study (Wright, 2004) applied the UK National Allocation Plan approach to 
three EU network carriers, British Airways, KLM and SAS, taking their latest actual 
year of 2002.  They found that, using the average of the four highest years between 
1998 and 2002, British Airways’ allocation would be 12% above their 2002 actual 
emissions, KLM’s 3% above, and SAS’s 17% below.  However, their intra-EU 
emissions were estimated using revenue shares.  This is likely to have significantly 
exaggerated the EU share of emissions for these airlines. 
 
Britannia is owned by the pan-European tour group, TUI, and has recently set up its 
own LCC, Thomsonfly.  Some of its aircraft have been transferred to this subsidiary, 
such that its overall growth has also not been large. 
 
The third airline, easyJet, grew by around 30% last year, but this growth is now slowing 
to 15%.  However, even at this rate they would still need to purchase significant 
quantity of allowance, and the average period is also of vital interest to such an airline. 
 
Table 2 below shows an allocation based on the average of 2003 and 2004 CO2 
emissions, in order not to penalise fast growing LCCs.  The 2005 estimates were based 
on 4% increase in total fuel burn for British Airways, 30% for easyJet and 10% for 
Britannia/Thomsonfly (based on its faster growing LCC arm).  For 2006, the projected 
changes were 4%, 15% and 10% respectively.  These growth rates did not explicitly 
take into account fleet changes and the likely improvement in fuel efficiency (eg 
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easyJet) or deterioration (eg a greater share of operations for Thomsonfly with smaller 
aircraft). 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The analysis shows that the LCC would need to purchase the most extra allowance in 
the market, and at US$40 per tonne CO2 this would impose an extra charge for 2006 of 
$2.17 per passenger (or a reduction in profitability of $62 m).   The initial premium on 
the average fare would only be around 3% for easyJet and much lower for the other two 
airlines.  At $100 per tonne the LCC cost would rise to $7.33. 
 
7.2 Auctioning 
The analysis in Table 3 is based on the traffic growth rates and fuel burn shown in Table 
2.  This option assumes that all the required CO2 emissions will need to be purchased in 
the open market at $40 per tonne.  This is somewhat higher than the market levels that 
were reached from the existing EU scheme.  In support, pressure from higher prices is 
likely to come from a tightening of the existing scheme, and the fact that aviation, as a 
net purchase of allowances, would be able to trade with participants from other 
industries.  A closed airline trading system was not considered. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The above estimate works out as a $5.87 per passenger premium for easyJet, or 9% of 
the average fare, assuming all of the cost is passed on to the passenger.  At $100 per 
tonne the extra cost would rise to $14.68 per passenger.  The total cost would be too 
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large to absorb in profits.  On the other hand, British Airways’ average European fare 
was around US$260 in 2004/05, such that the extra $4.18 would only amount to about 
1.6%.  It could also be covered by network revenues. 
 
7.3 Benchmarking 
 
The benchmarking formulae in 6.3 (Equation 3) above have been applied to the three 
airlines, assuming that the scheme is restricted to UK airlines and EEA operations.  It 
has also been restricted to passengers, with air cargo excluded.  This type of traffic is 
much less significant on intra-EEA routes than long-haul operations.  The total 
emissions that would need to be purchased in the market would be the actual emissions 
by all airlines for that year less Etotal.  
 
The example in Table 4 below assumes that the target or baseline is set at total UK EEA 
passenger kms in 2003.  Other targets would also be possible, but a more recent year 
penalises LCCs less, and could always be tightened later.   
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The cost of the excess allowance needed in 2005 and 2006 is again based on a market 
price of $40 per tonne, and the growth rates previously adopted.  Britannia/Thomsonfly 
is in credit on this allocation basis, because of its high efficiency relative to the 
benchmark.  This is through a combination of higher loads per flight and longer sectors.  
The LCC is still penalised most, but, at least initially, not far off the burden on the 
network carrier. 
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In order to address the problems associated with the first benchmarking approach 
(discussed above), the more complex Equation 8 was applied to the three airlines, also 
using the base year data.  These results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
It can be seen that Britannia/Thomsonfly no longer performs as well against the new 
benchmarks and thus receives insufficient allowance, resulting in a need in 2006 to 
spend $17 million on purchasing extra in the market.  This would not be an excessive 
amount relative to its average fare or profitability.  British Airways is not penalised for 
flying smaller aircraft and more premium passengers and thus is allocated more 
allowance than it is expected to need.  However, it is the flights and LTOs that cause the 
emissions and not the passengers, and it would seem unfair to allocate less to an airline 
that carried a greater percentage of premium passengers (as in the first benchmarking 
method).  Long-haul economy class passengers on intra-EU feeder sectors may also 
have paid a high total fare and could easily absorb such increases. 
 
8 Summary and conclusions 
 
A number of previous studies have examined the possible impact of various ways of 
implementing a European ETS.  These have highlighted possible distortions, without 
investigation the impact on specific airlines (apart from the limited Wright, 2004, 
analysis) or business models.  This paper attempts to do this for three UK airlines: the 
network carrier, British Airways, a major European LCC, easyJet, and one of the largest 
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charter/leisure airlines, Britannia/Thomsonfly (itself part of a pan-EU group).  It is 
argued that this gives a good indication of the relative impact on the business models, 
although a broader sample would be needed to be able to form any robust conclusions 
on the specific impacts. 
 
The above analysis assumes that an EU ETS for aviation would be only applied to intra-
EU flights.  This raises significant distortions by itself, but appears at present the most 
likely approach.  The focus has been on the three major types of allocation system: 
grandfathering/baseline, auctioning and benchmarking.   
 
The analysis has been based on recent data for each of the airlines (2003 and 2004).  To 
examine the impact over 2005 and 2006, traffic growth rates have assumed to be 4% for 
British Airways for each year, 30% and 15% for easyJet and 10% for 
Britannia/Thomsonfly for both years.  Cargo has been excluded on the basis of the 
minimum distortion it might cause for shorter haul routes. 
 
The summary in Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the impact is greater on the LCC in 
all cases, although not by too much.  This would be worse if the baseline had been 
based on less recent emissions.  Thus the cap is lenient, the main purpose being to give 
an incentive to airlines (or other industries) to reduce pollution in the future.  The 
position of Britannia depends to a large extent on how far its LCC (Thomsonfly) grows 
relative to its tour operator/leisure flights. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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The baseline or grandfathering approach tends to penalise the faster growing LCC and 
favour the network carrier.  The latter carries both long- and short-haul passengers on its 
intra-EU feeder services, and the cost could easily be absorbed in the total long-haul 
ticket price.  It would, however, put the EU network carrier at a small disadvantage 
relative to foreign hub carriers in the same markets. 
 
Auctioning (favoured by the CE Delft, 2005, study) is the most costly option for 
airlines, and needs further evaluation in terms of how the proceeds are used, and hybrid 
schemes.  Benchmarking is the second choice of the CE Delft (2005) study and a 
possible approach has been discussed in ICAO’s CAEP.  An alternative is proposed 
here of splitting the benchmark into a LTO and distance flown elements.  This is more 
complex in terms of data collection and monitoring, but avoids the sector length 
distortion and does not penalise low emissions smaller aircraft. 
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Table 1 
Selected airline traffic and operating data, Domestic & intra-EEA 
 2002 2003 2004 
BRITISH AIRWAYS       
Total RTKs million 1,383 1,529 1,196 
Total ATKs million 2,257 2,297 2,141 
Passengers (000) 16,627 17,265 17,036 
Aircraft kms 000) 153,538 152,565 136,014 
Flights 202,396 195,523 177,823 
Pax load factor (%) 61 67 56 
Average sector kms 759 780 765 
EEA/Domestic % RTKs 10 11 9 
Average pax per flight 82 88 96 
EASYJET       
Total RTKs million 628 1,347 1,633 
Total ATKs million 817 1,755 2,102 
Passengers (000) 8,947 17,626 21,224 
Aircraft kms 000) 61,697 132,744 158,498 
Flights 75,898 150,538 176,795 
Pax load factor (%) 77 77 78 
Average sector kms 813 882 897 
EEA/Domestic % RTKs 98 97 94 
Average pax per flight 118 117 120 
BRITANNIA/THOMSONFLY       
Total RTKs million 1,174 1,153 1,264 
Total ATKs million 1,304 1,262 1,472 
Passengers (000) 6,827 6,697 7,389 
Aircraft kms 000) 57,600 57,758 69,945 
Flights 28,839 28,837 35,871 
Pax load factor (%) 90 91 86 
Average sector kms 1,997 2,003 1,950 
EEA/Domestic % RTKs 75 72 70 
Average pax per flight 237 232 206 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority 
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Table 2 
Cost impact of Baseline/Grandfathering allocation method 
 British Airways easyJet Britannia/Thomsonfly 
CO2 allocations (000t) 1,736 1,553 868 
CO2 emissions projection (000t):    
2005 1,850 2,388 1,000 
2006 1,927 3,015 1,099 
CO2 emissions less cap (000t)    
2005 114 835 131 
2006 191 1,552 231 
Market price of carbon 
(US$/tonne) 
40 40 40 
Cost of excess (US$000):    
2005 2,621 33,402 5,253 
2006 5,456 62,062 9,251 
Excess cost / passenger (US$)    
2005 0.26 2.05 0.39 
2006 0.41 2.17 0.63 
Source:  UK CAA, ICAO Aircraft Engine Emissions DataBank on UK CAA website and Eurocontrol BADA 3.6 
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Table 3 
Cost impact of Auction allocation method 
 
British 
Airways 
easyJet Britannia/Thomsonfly 
CO2 emission projection (000t):    
2005 1,850 2,388 1,000 
2006 1,927 3,015 1,099 
Auction cost (US$000) @ $40    
2005 73,986 78,437 36,420 
2006 77,064 101,968 40,062 
Auction cost per passenger 
(US$) 
   
2005 4.18 5.87 3.00 
2006 4.18 5.87 3.00 
Source:  UK CAA, ICAO Aircraft Engine Emissions DataBank on UK CAA website and Eurocontrol BADA 3.6 
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Table 4 
Cost impact of Benchmarking method (1) 
 UK Industry (operations within EEA) 
Baseline RPKs m (2003) 97,173 97,173 97,173 
Baseline RPKs/US gallon 101 101 101 
Baseline US gallons (m) 962 962 962 
Baseline CO2 tonnes (000) 9,269 9,269 9,269 
 
British Airways easyJet Britannia/Thomsonfly 
RPKs per US gallon 76.8 117.5 147.6 
RPK share in 2003 (%) 12.0 13.6 14.0 
CO2 allowance (000t) 1,114 1,261 1,295 
Emissions less allowance (000t)    
2005 735 1,127 -295 
2006 812 1,844 -195 
Cost of excess (US$000):    
2005 29,417 45,094 -11,818 
2006 32,495 73,754 -7,820 
Excess cost / passenger (US$)    
2005 1.66 2.77 -0.89 
2006 1.76 3.49 -0.53 
Source:  UK CAA, ICAO Aircraft Engine Emissions DataBank on UK CAA website and Eurocontrol BADA 3.6 
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Table 5 
Cost impact of Benchmarking method (2) 
 UK Industry (operations within EEA) 
Baseline aircraft-kms m (2003) 712 712 712 
Baseline US gals/1000 a/c km* 1,042 1,042 1,042 
Baseline flights 000 (2003) 616 616 616 
Baseline US gallons/flight * 346 346 346 
Base gallons (cruise: km) 742 742 742 
Base gallons (LTO: flights) 213 213 213 
Total baseline US gallons (m) 955 955 955 
Baseline CO2 tonnes (000) 9,197 9,197 9,197 
 British Airways easyJet 
Britannia/ 
Thomsonfly 
Aircraft km share % 20.5 18.6 8.1 
Flight share % 27.8 24.8 4.7 
US gallons (m) allowance -kms 152.1 138.3 60.2 
US gallons (m) allowance -flight 59.1 52.7 10.0 
US gallons (m) allowance -total 211.2 191.0 160.2 
Total CO2 allowance (000t) 2,035 1,840 676 
Emissions less allowance (000t)    
2005 -185 548 324 
2006 -108 1,265 424 
Cost of excess (US$000):    
2005 -7,417 21,924 12,957 
2006 -4,339 50,584 16,955 
Excess cost / passenger (US$)    
2005 -0.42 1.35 0.97 
2006 -0.24 2.39 1.16 
Source:  UK CAA, ICAO Aircraft Engine Emissions DataBank on UK CAA website and Eurocontrol BADA 3.6 
* average for all UK short/medium haul fleet weighted by aircraft type flights/km flown 
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Figure 1 
Fleet fuel efficiency for short/medium-haul fleet, 2004 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
British Airways
easyJet
Britannia/Thomson
Industry (IATA)
Index (Industry = 100)
ASK/US gallon
RPK/US gallon
 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority and IATA 
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Figure 2 
Summary of cost impact of allocation options in 2006 (US$ per passenger) 
-1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00
Baseline
Auctioning
Benchmarking (1)
Benchmarking (2)
US$ cost per passenger (2006)
Britannia/Thomsonfly
easyJet
British Airways
 
 
